

Zhang Jiucheng 張九成 as an Eminent Advocate of the Cheng Learning (Chengxue 程學) in the Early Southern Song

LEE Junghwan

Abstract

The main objective of this study is to explore the characteristics of the early Southern Song Cheng learning (*chengxue* 程學) tradition, which remains a missing link in Neo-Confucian history, through examining the scholarship of Zhang Jiucheng 張九成 (1092-1159). Zhang's scholarship is characterized by two prominent features. Zhang was a prolific commentator of Confucian classics, covering the *Zhongyong*, the *Mencius*, and the *Book of Documents*, to name a few. Albeit diversely formulated, this single principle mainly concerns how to grasp the inner morality of human nature (or the inner mind) and put it into practice. This practical sphere of self-cultivation prescribed by Zhang shows high affinity to the Buddhist counterparts, which invited severe criticism from Zhu Xi and later Neo-Confucian scholars.

Nonetheless, the rise of Zhang Jiucheng in the intellectual community of the early Southern Song sheds light on how the Cheng learning tradition was understood at that time. Philosophically, Zhang reconciled the conceptual contradiction between the naturalness of the inner mind (or human nature) and the artificiality of human efforts by separating the realm of spontaneous manifestation of the inner mind from the realm of subsequent intentional actions. However, this approach leads to another philosophical problem, namely a

* This paper was supported by Edward Kwan Rim Research Fund, Sungkyunkwan University, 2014. I also acknowledge that the present paper is a thorough revision of a chapter in my doctoral dissertation, entitled, "A Groundwork for Normative Unity: Zhu Xi's Reformation of the 'Learning of the Way' Tradition." (Harvard University, 2008).

** LEE Junghwan: Assistant Professor, Department of Confucian Studies and Eastern Philosophy, Sungkyunkwan University (E-mail: leejunghw@skku.edu)

dichotomization of the mind (or human nature) into the object to seek and the agent of seeking it, a problem which Zhu Xi later brought to light and addressed.

Keywords: Zhang Jiucheng, the Cheng learning tradition, the early Southern Song, the naturalness of the inner mind, the artificiality of human efforts, spontaneous manifestation

1. Introduction

The early Southern Song remains as a missing link in Neo-Confucian history. Most studies on this subject focus on the single line of transition basically from the Cheng brothers to Zhu Xi 朱熹 (1130-1200) via Yang Shi 楊時 (1053-1135), also called “the Learning Transmitted to the South” (*dao nan xue* 道南學). However, records of the sayings (*yulu* 語錄) of the Cheng brothers (i.e., Cheng Hao 程顥 [1032-1085] and Cheng Yi 程頤 [1032-1085]) were scattered during the Northern-Song and Southern-Song transition, therefore they were not available for the literati of the early Southern Song. They were first integrated by Yang Shi and published by Zhang Shi 張栻 (1133-1180) in 1166, and the collection was further enlarged by Zhu Xi and published in 1168. Nor did the Cheng brothers leave commentaries on any of the Confucian classics apart from Cheng Yi’s commentary on the *Book of Changes*. It seems that their literary collection (*wenji* 文集) was the only source available for the early Southern Song literati to learn the teaching of the Cheng brothers, so it is unsurprising that their contemporaries would have had a significantly different understanding of their ideas than those put forward by present studies of their scholarship, particularly their philosophical thought, which are primarily based on the *Henan Chengshi yishu* 河南程氏遺書, the Cheng brothers’ *yulu* which were later compiled by Zhu Xi. Among the four disciples of the Cheng brothers—Xie Liangxuo, You Zuo, Lü Dalin, and Yang Shi, Yang was the only one who survived the Northern- and Southern- Song transition. However, Yang’s scholarship does not neatly coincide with those of the other disciples, differing particularly from that of Xie Liangzuo. The Hunan learning (*hunan xue* 湖南學) of Hu Anguo 胡安國 and Hu Hong 胡宏 was prominent during the early Southern Song, but because of its uniqueness, it is questionable to what degree this family-centered learning was in line with the Cheng learning tradition.¹⁾ With this context in mind, the main objective of the present study is to explore the characteristics of the early Southern Song Cheng learning (*chengxue* 程學) tradition by examining the scholarship of Zhang Jiucheng 張九成 (1092-1159).

At present, Zhang Jiucheng is largely thought of as a

1) Many scholars agree that the Hunan learning represents Neo-Confucian scholarship during the early Southern Song. For this view, see Tillman (1992); Cai (2011); Hou (1984-7).

representative scholar in the Cheng learning tradition.²⁾ As is discussed below, Zhang himself emerged within the intellectual society of the Southern Song as a devoted follower of the Cheng learning, thus establishing a high reputation among his contemporaries. Nonetheless, Zhu Xi's severe criticism of his scholarship as "learning of Chan Buddhism disguised as Confucianism" still exerts a great influence over our understanding of his scholarship.³⁾ At present, the most commonly held theme in discussions of his philosophy concerns the doctrinal affinity between his thought and Chan Buddhism.⁴⁾ Apart from his strong political connection with Dahui Zonggao 大慧宗杲, a leading Chan Buddhist master at the time, Zhang persistently criticized the doctrinal defects of Chan Buddhism. In the early Southern Song, it is important to note that the Cheng learning in general was berated as an "empty heterodoxy" (*xuwu yicuan* 虛無異端).⁵⁾ In other words, its doctrinal affinity with Buddhism was a unique feature of the Cheng learning tradition during the early Southern Song, which means that an in-depth examination of this feature is indispensable for impartially understanding the true character of the Cheng learning then out of which Zhu Xi's scholarship grew. In this light, Zhang's scholarship deserves another, more careful, look.

2. Self-Identification as a Follower of the Cheng Learning

The rise of Zhang Jiucheng as a nationally renowned scholar dovetailed with the unique political environment of the early Southern Song. While the Southern Song government had hurriedly reinstated a civil service examination to recruit elites necessary for its restoration at the new temporary capital, Hangzhou, it did not want incompetent literati to receive the windfall gains that resulted from the turmoil caused by the loss of Northern China to Jurchen. Before resuming the local level examination in 1132, the government banned all those who

2) For example, Tillman, *ibid*, 24-29; Hou, *ibid*, 304-318.

3) Zhu Xi, "*za xue bian* 雜學辨" *Zhu Xi ji* 朱熹集 (Chengdu Shi: Sichuan jiaoyu chubanshe, 1996), 72.3770.

4) For example, Ichiki (2002), 128-174; Kondō (1988), 109-123; Borrell (1999), 62-108.; Tillman, *Ibid*; and Hou Wailu, *Ibid*.

5) For this, see Li Xinchuan 李心傳, *Dao ming lu* 道命錄 (Reprint. Taipei: Wenhai chubanshe, 1981), 4:3a-9b.

had already failed the examination twice or more from applying again. Zhang would have been one of the aspiring civil servants to be affected by this regulation, as by the end of the Northern Song period, he had already unsuccessfully taken the examination held at Kaifeng at least twice. In 1131, after hearing of this disheartening news, Zhang had taken action to reverse it, writing a letter to Li Guang 李光 (1078-1159), the official who was then in charge of administering the examination as a vice director of the Ministry of Personnel, to solicit one more chance. Part of his letter read as follows:

[1] Once reading Zixia's saying of "cleaning and sweeping, and polite conversation" in the *Analects*, I was able to grasp what the former Kings called the way of the elementary learning. Once reading the phrase of "a way to the attainment of sincerity in one's self" in the *Mengzi*, I was able to grasp what the former Kings called the way of the great learning.

[2] In the past, our Master transmitted the Way at Zhu and Si. Once Yanzi grasped it, it became the learning of "never misdirected his anger, and never made the same mistake twice":⁶⁾ Once Zengzi grasped it, it became the learning of "in his deportment and manner [he keeps from violence and heedlessness]; in regulating his countenance [he keeps near to sincerity]; and in his words and tones [he keeps far from lowness and impropriety]."⁷⁾ Alas, Yanzi died young, therefore his learning was not be transmitted. However, Zengzi transmitted this Way to Zisi, so Zisi came to have the doctrine of *zhongyong*. Then, Zixi transmitted this Way to Mengzi, so Mengzi came to have the argument for humanity and righteousness. After Mengzi passed away, this Way of the sage was no longer transmitted.

[3] High-minded persons submitted themselves to Mr. Śākya. Yet, the characteristics of Mr. Śākya's learning are that "its words extend to all parts, but in reality [they] impedes our morality and that he claimed to an exhaustive understanding of inscrutable changes, but [his understanding] does not reach to the level of comprehending the truth of things and thereby accomplishing one's duties." I suggest that one rectify the learning of Mr. Śākya with Mengzi's [teaching.] "Learning is what the Three Dynasties commonly share, and its objective is to illuminate the cardinal human relations."⁸⁾ How could one say Mr. Śākya understood the cardinal human relations?⁹⁾

6) For translation, Legge, *Confucian Analects*, 185, with minor changes.

7) For translation, Legge, *Confucian Analects*, 209, with minor changes.

8) In the *Mengzi*, it must be read as follows, "The Three Dynasties commonly used the name of 'xue 學'" but Zhang cut it out of its context, referring to "learning" in general by *xue*.

9) Zhang Jiucheng, "Shang Li Taifa canzheng shu 上李泰發參政書" in *Zhang Jiucheng Quan Songwen* 全宋文 (hereafter, QSW) ed, 184:4-7. 某讀書至論語因子夏論灑掃應對之說。乃得夫先王所謂小學之道焉。又讀書至孟子誠身有道之說。乃得夫先王所謂大學之道焉。…昔吾夫子傳斯道於洙泗間。顏子得之。故其為學也。不遷怒。不貳過。曾子得之。故其為學也。動容貌。正顏色。出辭氣。惜乎顏子短命其學不傳。曾子傳斯道於子思。故子思有中庸之論。子思傳斯道於孟子。故孟子有仁義之說。孟子既沒聖道絕矣。…至其所謂高明者。拱手而歸於釋

The main purpose of this letter was to attain eligibility for the next civil service examination, and Zhang filled it with remarks which identify himself as a follower of the Cheng Learning without directly alluding to the names of the Cheng brothers. Zhang's coupling of the elementary learning and the great learning in the first part ([1]) of the letter just cited is an idea that can be found in one of Cheng Hao's memorials for school-reform titled "Qing xiu xuexiao zunshi ru qushi zhazi 請修學校尊師儒取士劄子," which later would be adopted by Zhu Xi. In the second part ([2]) of the letter just cited, Zhang reiterates the idea of the legitimate transmission of the Way (*daotang* 道統) from Confucius to Zengzi to Zisi and to Mencius. This *daotang* idea, although initially invented by Han Yu 韓愈 (768-824) in the Tang, was reformulated by Cheng Yi in his tomb inscription for Cheng Hao. This idea became one of the most popular marks of the Cheng Learning fellowship in the early Southern Song. Lastly, the underlined passage in the third part ([3]) of Zhang's letter is a nearly verbatim quotation from Cheng Yi's tomb inscription for his brother.

Zhang was a native of Hangzhou, and it is highly probable that he was well informed of Zhao Ding's 趙鼎 (1085-1147) political strategy. By the end of the Northern Song, the List of the Yuanyou Faction (*yuanyou dang ji* 元祐黨籍) strictly prohibited the disciples of the Cheng brothers such as Yang Shi, Xie Liangzuo, and You Zuo from publicly promoting the learning of their masters. As the Southern Song era began, the ban was lifted, and Zhao Ding, who was Prime Minister at the time, implemented an examination policy which was more favorable to advocates of the Cheng Learning. This political milieu contributed tremendously to the establishment of the Cheng Learning as an intellectual-political tradition.¹⁰ In response, opponents of the Cheng Learning denounced it as "a specialized learning" (*zhuanmen zhi xue* 專門之學) or "an empty heterodoxy" (*xuwu yiduan* 虛無異端).¹¹ This criticism of the Cheng learning as a heterodoxy indirectly testifies to the fact that the followers of the Cheng Learning were successfully emerging in the political arena of the early Southern Song. Riding on this political wave by identifying himself as a

氏。且夫釋氏之為學也。言為無所不周。實則礙於倫理。自謂窮神知化而不足以開物成務。某請以釋氏之學求正於孟子。孟子曰學則三代共之皆所以明人倫也。釋氏豈知人倫乎。

10) Teraji (1988), 108-110 and 119-124.

11) For this, see Li Xinchuan, *Dao ming lu*, 4:3a-9b.

follower of the Cheng Learning in his letter to Li Guang, this strategy ultimately proved successful for Zhang Jiucheng: he attained eligibility for the 1132 local examination and ranked first at the court examination held in 1133.

Zhang's career as an official was marked by exceptionally rapid rise and precipitous fall. Upon passing the examination, he was quickly promoted in the officialdom. After a short period of service as a local official, he gained a position at the court with the support of Zhao Ding. In 1138, five years after the examination success, he was appointed as Expositor-in-waiting as well as Participant in the Classics Colloquium. When Zhao Ding, his protégé, lost power to Qin Gui, however, he was also immediately demoted to a local position and then was exiled to Nan'an, Guangdong Province, where he would stay for fourteen years. Soon after regaining his status as an official, he died.¹²⁾

In contrast, Zhang's career as a scholar seems rather fortunate. Specifically, he was widely respected as a genuine successor of the Cheng Learning. Zhao Ding's favorable policies for advocates of the Cheng Learning extended to Cheng Yi 程沂, a nephew of Cheng Yi 程頤, who survived the Northern- and Southern-Song transition. In 1158, Cheng was appointed as a magistrate of Kunshan 崑山 County in the modern Shaoxing 紹興 area. When Cheng moved and expanded the government school of Kunshan County, he sent a letter to Zhang with the remark that "You learned from the great scholar[s] (*dà ru* 大儒), therefore your scholarship could not be comparable to that of vulgar scholars."¹³⁾ Although the letter does not specify whom Cheng referred to by "the great scholar[s]," there is little doubt that this Cheng Yi's nephew had the Cheng Learning in mind as the standard of the authentic Confucianism and identified Zhang as a sincere follower of the Cheng Learning.

Zhang was a prolific commentator of the Confucian classics, and his works cover the majority of the Confucian classics. As Kondō Masanori has pointed out, he wrote commentaries to all the soon-to-be *Four Books* before Zhu Xi.¹⁴⁾ His expository works also include the *Book of Documents*, the *Book of Filial Piety*, the *Book of Documents*, and

12) Zhang's biography in *Song shi* 宋史, Zhonghua shuju edition (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1977), 11577-11579.

13) Zhang Jiucheng, "Kunshan xue ji 崑山學記," *Zhang Jiucheng* QSW ed, 184:158-9.

14) Kondō, *ibid*, 109.

the *Annals*. Two versions of the records of Zhang Jiucheng's sayings (*yulu* 語錄), *Hengpu xinchuan* 橫浦心傳 and *Hengpu ri xin* 橫浦日新, were published and circulated during the Southern Song, and both of them are still extant. The latter was incorporated as the final entry of the *Zhu ru ming dao* 諸儒鳴道, an anthology which compiled the works (mostly *yulu* style records) of eleven Northern and early Southern Song scholars in chronological order, beginning with Zhou Dunyi's *Tongshu* 通書, extending to Siam Guang's *Sushui yushu* 涑水迂書, *Yulu of the Two Chengs* 二程語錄, and Xie Liangzuo's 謝良佐 *Shangcai Yulu* 上蔡語錄, before ending with Zhang's *Hengpu ri xin*. The compilation date of this anthology is unknown, but must be after 1170, when the *Yulu of the Two Chengs* was compiled by Zhu Xi. The currently extant version is a reprint made in 1235 by a local official, Huang Zhuangyou 黃壯猷,¹⁵⁾ which implies that despite Zhu Xi's relentless criticism of his scholarship, Zhang still maintained a reputation as an outstanding Confucian scholar by the end of the Southern Song.

3. The *Daotong* Idea in the *Book of Documents*

The "Thorough Exposition of the *Book of Documents*" (*Shuzhuan tong lun* 書傳統論) is a series of essays covering each and every chapter of the *Book of Documents*. In dealing with this historical text, Zhang pays particular attention to historically corroborating the idea of *daotong* (the legitimate transmission of the Way) between the Confucian sage kings and ministers before Confucius.

The one character "attentiveness" (*jing* 敬) is very concise in its practice, but the range of its effect is very wide. What is attentiveness? [It is the state of the mind, in which] untruthful thoughts do not arise, nor do all kinds of vice arise. Duke Shao repeated this one character, but how could it be the case that what Duke Shao strived for in his entire life is no more than this one character, and what the principle transmitted through the mind (*chuan xin zhi fa* 傳心之法) from Hou Ji to Kings Wen and Wu was no more than this one character? Alas, there were many rulers either who were attentive so gained Heavenly Mandate or who were not attentive so lost Heavenly Mandate. ...¹⁶⁾

15) Reproduced in the format of Microform from the printed copy deposited at the Chung-kuo Shang-hai tu shu kuan. It is available at Harvard Yenching Library (FC 9117).

As has been previously mentioned, the idea of *daotong* was a major indicator of the fellowship of the Cheng Learning. Zhang here refers to it as “the principle transmitted through the mind,” which apparently comes from the Chan Buddhist terminology. He then incorporates this idea into the historical text, thus transforming it into a historical fact. The other strand of his claim, which is intertwined with the *daotong* idea and penetrates through Zhang’s essays, is to specify what the principle that was transmitted between the sages was. As his constant use of the expression, “*zhi zai* 止在,” implies, he presupposes that the principle must be expressed in a succinct form, and he singles out “attentiveness” as the principle.

The *daotong* idea is also reiterated in the chapter of “*Xianyou yide lun* 咸有一德論.”

When he announced his retirement, Yi Yin spelled out the principle transmitted from mind to mind in order to convey it to King Taijia. It is the same that when Yao abdicated the throne to Shun, and Shun abdicated it to Yu, they conveyed to each other one single saying, “Hold fast on to the *zhong*” (*yun zhi jue zhong* 允執厥中). The *zhong* here indicates what Yi Yin called the “one virtue” (*yide* 一德) (of the “*xian you yi de* 咸有一德”). The principle to rule the world is nothing other than this. How can we not keep it in mind?¹⁷⁾

In this essay, Zhang identifies “hold[ing] fast on to the *zhong*” rather than attentiveness, as the principle of transmission, underscoring its simple and clear characteristic, this time, with the expression “one single saying.” In “*Gao Tao mo lun* 皋陶謨論,” he chooses different phrases which appear in the chapters of “*Gao Tao mo* 皋陶謨” and “*Da Yu mo* 大禹謨” in the *Book of Documents*.

What the Great Yu strived for in his entire life is no more than “realize the difficulty.” What Gao Tao strived for in his entire life is no more than

-
- 16) Zhang Jiucheng, “*Shao gao lun* 召誥論,” *Zhang Jiucheng*, 184:93-94. 敬之一字.其行甚要.其功甚博.何謂敬.妄慮不起.百邪不生.是敬也.……召公反覆以此一字為言.豈召公平生所得在此一字.而自后稷至文武傳心之法.止在此一字乎.嗚呼.後世人主以敬而得天命.不敬而失天命者.亦多矣. …
- 17) Zhang Jiucheng, “*Xianyou yide lun* 咸有一德論,” *Zhang Jiucheng*, 184:66-68. 伊尹以告歸.故歷舉傳心之法以付太甲.猶堯之禪舜.舜之禪禹.以一言相付.曰允執厥中是也.中即伊尹所謂一德也.君天下之法.止於此而已矣.可不念哉. According to “the Dynastic Bibliography” of the *Official History of Song*, this chapter was circulated separately but with two of his other articles which will be analyzed below (*Song shi*, 5071).

“sincerely pursues the course of one’s virtue.”¹⁸⁾ ... Students in the later generations should apprehend Yu’s saying, “realize the difficulty,” and Gao Tao’s saying, “sincerely pursue” with mind and assiduously put it into practice. [Then, if they] apprehend that [the way to deal with] all affairs in the past, present, and future does not go beyond the compass of “realize the difficulty” and “sincerely pursue,” the mind of the Great Yu and Gao Tao will be manifested...¹⁹⁾

Depending on the chapters chosen to interpret, Zhang differently identifies the principle of transmission as “attentiveness,” “hold fast on to the *zhong*” “realize the difficulty,” and “sincerely pursues the course of one’s virtue.” This inconsistency in phrasing, however, does not obscure the primary intention underlying Zhang’s interpretation, which was to emphasize that the sages in antiquity comprehended that there exists one single highest-order principle on which all human virtues converge and which is applicable to all human affairs, in terms of capacity. This principle is not merely the most important one among many but the only one *sufficient* to cover all, as implied by the phrase “[the way to deal with] all affairs in the past, present, and future does not go beyond [this principle].” Zhang held that although this principle was differently formulated between the sages, this single principle, as is suggested by the repeated use of the phrase “*zhi zhai*,” was always articulated in a highly simple and clear form. This reductionist approach is predominant in Zhang Jiucheng’s expositions of the classics, and the most prominent case is his commentary on the *Zhongyong*

4. Zhang’s Commentary on the *Zhongyong*

After the fall of the Southern Song, Zhang Jiucheng’s scholarship quickly faded away from the intellectual scene. During the Southern Song period, however, he established a firm reputation as a scholar in the fellowship of the Cheng Learning. At present, Zhang’s commentary on the *Zhongyong* *Zhongyong shuo* 中庸說, is only partially extant (only the first three *juan* 卷 have survived). This text had completely ceased to exist in China, but during the Republican period, Zhang Yuanjie 張

18) For translation, Legge, *The Book of Historical Records*, 53.

19) Zhang Jiucheng, “Gao Tao mo lun 皋陶謨論,” *Zhang Jiucheng* 184:56. ...大禹平生之謀。止在克艱。而皋陶平生之謀。止在允迪厥德。...後之學者。因禹克艱之言。皋陶允迪之言。心體而力行之。見天下萬事往來今古。皆不出於克艱允迪之中。則大禹皋陶之心見矣。...

元濟, a distant descendant of Zhang Jiucheng, acquired a copy preserved in Tōhokuji Buddhist Monastery 東福寺 in Kyoto, Japan, and compared it to the passages quoted in Zhu Xi's "*Za xue bian* 雜學辨," thus confirming its authenticity. He then brought it back to China and reprinted it at Shangwu yinshuguan 商務印書館 in 1936.²⁰)

The opening part of Zhang's commentary on the *Zhongyong* reads as follows:

(A) [The phrase] "What Heaven imparts is called nature" is about the original substance of nature; [the phrase] "To follow nature is called the Way" is about human [efforts] to pursue the Way; and [the phrase] "Cultivating the Way is called education" is about the practice of the Way.

(B) (B-1)[The phrase] "What Heaven imparts is called nature" is merely to extol the importance of nature, but it does not yet signify [the stage] that a person receives it as his own thing. (B-2) [The phrase] "To follow nature is called the Way" [refers to the stage that] a person possesses it in himself as his own thing and enters into the *zhong* of benevolence, righteousness, propriety, and wisdom. But it does not yet signify [the stage of] the application and practice of the Way. (B-3) [The phrase] "To cultivate the Way is called education" [refers to the stage that] humanity is practiced in the relation of father and son, righteousness is practiced in the relation of ruler and minister, propriety is practiced in the relation of guest and host, and wisdom is practiced by the wise. [Only at this last stage,] the rise and fall of the Way is manifested.

(C) The meaning of *zhongyong* is based on this three. (C-1) [The phrase] "What Heaven imparts is called nature" indicates something prior to the emergence of pleasure, anger, sorrow, and joy, so it is called *zhong* (immanence). (C-2) [The phrase] "To follow nature is called the Way" signifies "being cautious and apprehensive over what is invisible and inaudible," thereby nurturing the principle prior to the emergence of pleasure, anger, sorrow, and joy, and it is the way to pursue the *zhong*. (C-3) At the stage of "Cultivating the Way is called education," nature that Heaven imparts and the Way to follow human nature are manifested as functions, and each and all manifestations attain due measure and degree, so it is called *yong* (normality and appropriateness).²¹)

This comment is comprised of three sections. The first section (A) recapitulates what each of the opening three consecutive phrases of the

20) Zhang Yuanjie, "Postscript," *Zhongyong shuo* 中庸說 (Shanghai: Shangwuyin shuguan, 1936).

21) Zhang Jiucheng, *Zhongyong shuo*, 1:1a-2b. …天命之謂性。此指性之本體而言也。率性之謂道。此指人之求道而言也。修道之謂教。此指道之運用而言也。天命之謂性。第贊性之可貴耳。未見人收之為己物也。率性之謂道則人體之為己物而入於仁義禮智中矣。然而未見其設施運用也。修道之謂教則仁行於父子。義行於君臣。禮行於賓主。智行於賢者。而道之等降隆殺於是而見焉。中庸之名立於此三者矣。天命之謂性。喜怒哀樂未發以前者也。所以謂之中。率性之謂道。此戒慎恐懼於不睹不聞。以養喜怒哀樂未發以前之理。此所以求中也。至於修道之謂教。則以天命之性率性之道而見於用。發而皆中節矣。所以謂之庸也。…

Zhongyong primarily means, thus outlining the overall following explications. The second section (B) is also divided into three parts in accord with the first three phrases of the *Zhongyong*. This section is composed in a procedural format, proceeding from the first stage of human nature itself (B-1) to the second stage of individual embodiments of human nature as the virtues immanent in the self (B-2), and to the “manifestation” (*xian* 見=現) of the Way in the world as the ultimate consequence of the preceding stages (B-3).

This section can also be seen as being comprised of two descriptive parts and one prescriptive part. The first stage (B-1) is an ontological explication of the origin and existence of human nature. In this part, the main agent is Heaven, which imparts nature to human beings, with Zhang Jiucheng emphasizing that the existence of nature transcends the human realm by saying that “it does not yet signify [the stage] that a person receives it as his own thing.” The third part (B-3) is also descriptive both of the human practices of inherent virtues in the adequate cardinal human relations (e.g., “humanity is practiced in the relation of father and son”) and of “the rise and fall of the Way” as the consequence of human practices. In this part, however, human practices are not depicted prescriptively as, for example, the moral duties of human agents. Instead, such “application and practice of the Way” are described as the consequence of the second stage (B-2), in which human nature is ontologically united with the being of the self, and in which an individual as an agent is capable of taking action with respect to the four cardinal virtues “immanent in” (*zhong* 中) the self. In other words, “the rise and fall of the Way” is contingent on whether, and how, human agents put the innate virtues into practice, and the success and failure of this practice is contingent on this action at the second stage. The second stage is the key link between what is posited as ontological truth and values and the ultimate manifestation of such truth and values.

The third section (C) elaborates on the preceding explication in connection to the distinctive meaning of the words *zhong* and *yong*. In the *zhong* state of immanence (C-1), human nature has not yet arisen to the surface of human consciousness (i.e., “something prior to the emergence” of feelings); therefore, human nature itself has no relevant effect on the human realm. Nor can an individual agent take any action with respect to it. The *yong* state (C-3) refers to a state of affairs in which human nature is effectually manifested in accord with

due measure and degree, ensuing normality and appropriateness as a result. As is in the second section, the link between the transcendent being of human nature and the eventual consequence of its manifestation is the second part (C-2), implying that the “rise” or “fall” of the Way is contingent on whether or not human agents properly “pursue the *zhong*” Because human nature itself is ontologically beyond the influence of human understanding and action at the *zhong* state, the pursuit of the *zhong* by a human agent is the sole determinant of “the rise and fall of the Way” in Zhang’s formulation.

Zhang Jiucheng prescribes the proper method of “pursuing the *zhong*” by quoting the maxims in the *Zhongyong*: “being cautious and apprehensive over what is invisible and inaudible.” He also suggests that this method of practice will bring out the effect of “nurturing the principle prior to the emergence (*weifa* 未發) of pleasure, anger, sorrow, and joy,” which is apparently equivalent to the method of “nurturing (or cultivating) human nature” (*yangxing* 養性) in the *Mencius*. In short, he argues in this comment that “the rise and fall of the Way” is contingent primarily on the practice of “being cautious and apprehensive over what is invisible and inaudible.”

Zhang’s almost exclusive emphasis on the practice of “being cautious and apprehensive over what is invisible and inaudible” continues throughout the rest of his commentary on the *Zhongyong*. For example, the section on wisdom, humanity, and courage in Chapter 20 reads as follows:

… One who has comprehended these three [virtues of wisdom, humanity, and courage] will immediately pursue the paths of wisdom, humanity, and courage. Then, how could [it happen that] the self is not cultivated? … The way of ordering the world and states is also no other than the paths of wisdom, humanity, and courage. Oh, how simple and clear it is! What do [all of] the so-called learning, action, and the sense of shame mean? They commonly refer to “being cautious over what is invisible and being attentive over what is inaudible.” If one does not abide by (lit., entering into) it, one will be adrift like duckweed [floating] on water, which drifts north and south with the wind. Then, where could one anchor himself? This is why a superior man is watchful over himself while alone.²²⁾

22) Zhang Jiucheng, *Zhongyong shuo*, 3:11a-b. … 知斯三者，則直趨知仁勇之路。身豈有不修哉。… 其所以治天下國家亦不出乎知仁勇之路而已。嗚呼豈不簡易明白乎。夫所謂學所謂行所謂恥何也。即戒慎不睹恐懼不聞之謂。學者不於此入，則泛然如萍之在水。逢風南北，有何所寄泊乎。此君子所以慎其獨也。

The original text of the *Zhongyong* deploys the three virtues distinctively and suggests that “the way of practicing them are one” (*suoyi xing zhi zhe yi* 所以行之者一), but does not specify what this “one” is. Zhang Jiucheng identifies it with the maxim of “being cautious and apprehensive over what is invisible and inaudible.” Overall, he recapitulates the original text into the line of reasoning that “the way of ordering the world and states,” which may be thought of as being complicated to understand and difficult to practice, converges on the three virtues, and the three virtues again converge on this single maxim. In short, he argues that all varied moral principles can be reduced to this maxim. In this vein, he underlines “simplicity and clarity” (*jianyi mingbai* 簡易明白).

Zhang’s exclusive attention to this maxim can be estimated statistically. The extant version of Zhang’s *Zhongyong shuo* continues through the first half of Chapter 20 of Zhu Xi’s edition of the *Zhongyong zhangju* 中庸章句, which amounts to approximately three-fifths of the total text. The rest of it seems permanently missing. This extant text is divided into thirty-three sections, of which twenty-six sections (approximately 78% of the total) include the maxim “being cautious and apprehensive over what is invisible and inaudible.” Seven of the twenty-six extant sections begin with this maxim. This maxim appears twice or more in most of the twenty-six sections, and in Section 25, Zhang alludes to this maxim five times.

Zhang’s explication is grounded on the presupposition or belief that human nature is something that a human agent is able to *directly* “pursue” and “nurture” even at the *weifā* state. The maxim of “nurturing human nature” implies that Mencius also takes human nature as the direct object of self-cultivation, but he does not associate the *weifā* state to the existential condition of human nature. By and large, the term *weifā* in this context means that human nature has not manifested itself in the domain of human consciousness, (therefore calling it human nature itself [*benti* 本體 or *benxing* 本性]), which is why it is described as being “invisible and inaudible.” Such a definition then leads to a question of how it might possible for an agent to “be cautious and apprehensive over” or “pursuing” it.

A deeper layer of the presupposition which underlies Zhang’s explication is grounded on the Mencian tenet that human nature is good: human nature itself is beyond our cognition and intelligence but spontaneously manifests itself in the domain of consciousness and thus

provides one with perfect guidance as to one's feeling and action. Described differently, the view holds that human nature always manifests itself in accordance with moral rules that are perfectly appropriate to given situations, and conversely, that all human moral rules are derivatives of this single, self-perfect origin of morality. On the one hand, this process of manifestation is spontaneous and self-perfect, which means that it does not therefore allow any involvement or interruption of human intelligence and efforts. On the other hand, human agency is the only possible outlet for the manifestation of human nature, which means that this process is therefore necessarily susceptible to the interruption of human agency. As a consequence, Zhang, like all other Neo-Confucian thinkers, insists that "elimination of personal desires" is the most important precondition to securing the intact manifestation of human nature. In this line of thinking, 'personal desire' is not confined to self-centered motivations but includes any thought, feeling, or desire which may affect, and thus impair, this manifestation process.

This precondition is not sufficient. Zhang adds to it the maxim of "being cautious and apprehensive over what is invisible and inaudible." How then can this practice, which by definition belongs to the area of artificiality (*wèi* 偽 in Xunzi's terminology), work in harmony with the manifestation process without interruption? In other words, is it possible to make this practice, when aimed at human nature, not fall into the problem of "pulling on the sprouts to help it grow" (*yamiao zhuzhang* 揠苗助長)?

5. Searching for the Inherent Moral Vitality

Zhang Jiucheng's literary collection contains a series of essays whose titles are adopted from three Confucian classics: "On the Lesser [Principle] of Demeanors" (*shao yi lun* 少儀論) from the *Book of Rites*, "On the Four Sprouts" (*si duan lun* 四端論) from the *Mengzi*, and "On the Village" (*xiang dang tong lun* 鄉黨統論) from the *Analects*. They were circulated as a set during the Southern Song independent of other of Zhang's writings and were later incorporated into his literary collection. They are closely intertwined with each other in terms of their main argument, and these texts do much to reveal the overall content and structure of his philosophical thought.

“On the Lesser [Principle] of Demeanors” centers on the concept of “the inner mind” (*nei xin* 內心). Zhang compared it to “the tranquil state of inactivity” (*jiran budong* 寂然不動) from the *Book of Changes* and “before the emergence of pleasure, anger, sorrow, and joy” from the *Zhongyong*; Zhang described this state of the inner mind as being characterized by “suddenly stripping off persistently recurring human desires” (乍脫人欲之營營) and explains the essential feature of the inner mind through an analogy to “the original vitality” (*yuanqi* 元氣) of a seed. As all other parts of trunk, branches, and leaves of a tree grow out of the innate vitality of a seed, Zhang describes all human norms, rituals, and values (i.e., “the lesser principle of demeanors” or *shao yi* 少儀) as deriving from the sole and ultimate origin of the inner mind.²³⁾

In the essay “On the Four sprouts,” Zhang attempts to reconcile the naturalness of the inner mind (or human nature) with the artificiality of human efforts. In characterizing the four sprouts (*sidian* 四端), Zhang once again emphasizes the spontaneous and therefore natural quality of the mind. He claims that “the heavenly principle, once encountering an affair, necessarily manifests itself, and [this process is such a thing that] cannot be stopped at will” (*qi tianli jueran yushi er fa, yu ta bu neng ye* 其天理決然遇事而發.欲罷不能也).²⁴⁾ He also borrows the expression “*zha ran* 乍然” (suddenly) from the *Mencius* to characterize this self-initiating process.

In principle, this characterization is at odds with the necessity of human efforts including moral self-cultivation. Spontaneity, by definition, denotes occurrences that do not involve human effort. On the other hand, the inherent morality of the inner mind (or the intrinsic heavenly principle) does not necessarily lead to the moral consequences of human thoughts and actions in a purely natural or spontaneous condition, thus necessitating a sort of involvement of human efforts. A major question then is how to reconcile these two precepts.

Zhang attempts to address this challenging problem by combining the teachings of Cheng Hao 程顥 with the *Mencius*.

Mengzi conclusively said, “If anyone knows how to give these four sprouts in the self the fullest expansion and development, the result will be like

23) Zhang Jiucheng, “Shao yi lun,” *Zhang Jiucheng*, 184:45.

24) Zhang Jiucheng, “Si duan lun 四端論,” *Zhang Jiucheng*, 184:49.

fire beginning to burn or a spring beginning to shoot forth.”²⁵⁾ “Knowing” is up to “I”, not others. Knowing means self-awareness.

Suppose [one is in] the state of [the mind] in compassion, being alarmed and worried. This is humanity in the self. If one already knows such a state, then one should extend and spread it to all human affairs, thereby making blood vessels well circulated. This is [the way] to “expand and develop it [to the fullest].” This is what “to extend” means. It is not difficult to know it, nor is it hard to extend it. Knowing [it] is similar with fire beginning to burn or a spring beginning to shoot forth. If one knows it but does not extend it, human desires will necessarily obstruct it. ... Therefore, [Mengzi] said, “If one can develop it to the fullest, it will be sufficient to protect the whole world.” This is exactly what the good circulation of blood vessels means.²⁶⁾

Rhetorically, Zhang interprets the term “knowing” (*zhi* 知) in the phrase quoted from the *Mencius* into “self-awareness” (*ti ren* 體認), which is reminiscent of Cheng Hao’s “On Understanding (or Knowing) Humanity” (*shi ren* 識仁), and his analogy of “extension” (*tui* 推) to “the good circulation of blood vessels” is an adaptation of Cheng Hao’s analogy of “*bu ren* 不仁” to the paralysis of limbs.

Zhang herein implicitly reconciles the spontaneity of the inner mind (or human nature, the heavenly principle) with the artificiality of human efforts by separating the realms of each. In interpreting the phrase quoted from the *Mencius*, he divides it into three sequential stages—first, the arising of “the four sprouts”; second, “knowing,” and third, “expansion and development.” The arising of “the four sprouts” at the first stage is purely spontaneous, occurring without any involvement of human effort, thus securing the ontological and procedural status of the inner mind or human nature as part of naturalness. In distinction, the second and third stages belong to the realm of human artificiality. As the anecdote of “replacing an ox with a goat” in the *Mencius* 1A7 demonstrates, the arising of a moral emotion (or sensitivity) from within does not always bring about self-awareness as a consequence. An agent is therefore required in a more narrow sense to be attentive to cognizing spontaneous arousals from within, and more broadly, to understand the inherent existence and spontaneous functions of this mind (or human nature). For Zheng,

25) For translation, Chan (1963), 65-66, with minor changes.

26) Zhang Jiucheng, “Si duan lun,” *Zhang Jiucheng* 184:50. 故孟子斷之。曰“凡有四端於我者知皆擴而充之矣。若火之始然泉之始達。”夫知之一字在我而不在人。知者體認之意。今惻隱之狀愀然怛然。是吾仁也。吾既知其狀矣。則推而達之於人事之間。使血脈流通。則擴而充之。即所謂推也。夫知之非艱而推之為艱。知也猶火之始然泉之始達也。知之而不推。是必有人欲以礙之也。... 故曰苟能充之。足以保四海。以謂血脈疏通也。

this stage of self-awareness and understanding belongs exclusively to the internal sphere of the self, so that he intentionally emphasizes that “‘Knowing’ is up to ‘I’, not others.” The third stage of “expansion and development” concerns the practical stage of putting an internal self-awareness of humanity into practice in human relations by going beyond the limit of the self and “extending” it to others. Overcoming the “obstruction” of “human desires” is a critical component of the process of extension from the self to others. Zhang’s use of the phrase “the good circulation of blood vessels” makes indirect reference to Cheng Hao’s remark that “the man of humanity regards all things between heaven and earth as an integral whole (lit., one body)” (*yi tiandi wanwu wei yiti* 以天地萬物爲一體).

Seen from a different angle, Zheng’s reconciliation of spontaneity and artificiality is accomplished in a negative fashion, an approach which is far more common in the Cheng Learning tradition. Like all other Neo-Confucians, Zhang adopts the belief in human nature (or the inner mind) as the only and ultimate origin of human values and norms, associating it with “the heavenly principle” (*tianli* 天理). Conversely, all human norms and values are derivatives of this single origin. From this perspective, the morality of one’s action is solely contingent on whether or not it defends the spontaneous manifestation of the inner mind from possible interruptions. Unless it is affected by any external elements such as personal desires, the inner mind (or human nature) always and necessarily guides one to behave appropriately to a given situation. In this line of thinking, personal desire does not simply refer to self-centered motivations but to any feeling, motivation, and deliberation (*siyu* 私欲 and *xiaozhi* 小知) which is external to this spontaneous process (The moral self-cultivation grounded on this belief is hardly compatible with the idea of “moral reasoning” in Western ethics, because morality is not something which can be gained through a reasoning process). In the same vein, in his essay “On the Village,” Zhang explains that Kongzi was able to act “consistently in accordance with the heavenly principle” because “from the beginning, personal motives never interrupt the course (lit. in-between) [of its manifestation]” (*yi jie tianli, chu weichang you yi hao siyi jieyu qi jian ya* 一皆天理。初未嘗有一毫私意介于其間也).²⁷⁾

Zhang also illuminates this genuine learning of the sages by

27) Zhang Jiucheng, “Xingdang tong lun 鄉黨統論,” *Zhang Jiucheng*, 184:51.

contrasting it with the other extremes represented by Buddhism and the stance of vulgar scholars (*suru* 俗儒). His criticism of them is based on the distinction between substance (*ti* 體) and derivative (*yang* 用: more commonly, function) distinction. Concerning the stance of vulgar scholars, he argues that it is preposterous to stick to the minor details of norms and rituals (i.e., *li* 禮) without seeking to grasp the inner mind.

If you have sincere intention to pursue this Way, you should seek the so-called innate mind prior to the emergence of pleasure, anger, sorrow, and joy. If you attain it, [you] should not stop [there], but ought to seek its manifestation, that is, the function that “each and all [manifestations of the *zhong*] attain due measure and degree.” ... If your actions are at odds with norms, why don't you [examine] the reason that your practice of seeking the innate mind is imperfect? If someone pays attention to [the minor] details of propriety of advancing and retreating and the details of rituals, he is only a vulgar scholar. Do you think a superior man is willing to behave thus?²⁸⁾

As has been previously discussed, Zhang held that norms and rituals are derivatives of the inner mind as the sole substance. Zhang advises readers that if they wish to make their actions morally right and good, they ought to pay attention to understanding and maintaining a proper attitude toward the substance, because the former (moral action) is a mere consequence of the latter (inner mind). It is of no use, for the same reason, to focus blindly on phenomenal aspects of norms and rituals.

On the contrary, Zhang criticized that Buddhism restrains its view to the inner aspect only, leading to a misleading doctrine:

[In addition to “being watchful over himself while alone” of the *Zhongyong*,] the *Book of Change* prescribes “inner attentiveness to straighten the inner side” (*jing yi zhi nei* 敬以直內), and Mencius did “exert the mind to the utmost and know one's nature” (*jin qi xin, zhi qi xing* 盡其心知其性). However, [the genuine self-cultivation] should not stop at grasping this. *Mr. Śākya was suspiciously near to it.* [However,] he stopped there and was not able to advance [to the higher level of] entering the greatness of the heavenly principle after [the stage of] suddenly stripping off persistently recurring human desires. [Due to] the boundless joy [resulting from the state of suddenly stripping off persistently recurring human desires], [he]

28) Zhang Jiucheng, “Shao yi lun,” *Zhang Jiucheng*, 184:46. 諸君誠有意於斯道,當自喜怒哀樂未發之前,求其所謂內心,儻有得焉,勿止也,當求夫發而中節之用,儻其於威儀之間齟齬未合,盍亦求內心之所以為未至者乎,若夫不得乎此,徒有事於進退盤辟儀章度數,是俗儒而已矣,君子肯為之乎。

believed the state of empty nothing-ness [in the mind] as the ultimate stage. Therefore, [Buddhists] consider the accomplishments of Yao, Shun, Wu, Tang, Wen, and Wu as dust and dirt, [the bonds between] father and son, between ruler and minister, between husband and wife, and between older brother and younger brother as wens and warts, and [the natural world of] heaven and earth, the sun and the moon, and [the seasonal changes of] spring, summer, fall, and winter as dream and illusion. They distance themselves from the heaven and human beings, split the root and the branches, and disunite the inner and the outer. ... [Buddhism] has the superb substance in isolation without the great function to fully flourish. This is exactly where its wrongdoing against the sages lies.²⁹⁾

The remark that “*Mr. Śākya was suspiciously near to it*” implies that Zhang acknowledges Buddhism is mostly correct at the first stage of “returning to the root” (*gui gen fan ben* 歸根反本),³⁰⁾ which largely corresponds to the Confucian counterparts such as “being watchful over himself while alone” and “inner attentiveness to straighten the inner side.” Nonetheless, the fundamental problem of Buddhism lies in its misunderstanding of “the root,” which necessarily leads to mistakes in the dimension of function.

As is discussed in “On the Four sprouts,” an intrinsic attribute of the inner mind is its tendency to extend its inner aspect to other beings. Additionally, as is seen in his analogy to the original vitality of a seed, Zhang contended that the inner mind tends to bring out moral actions and ritual proprieties as its consequence. In contrast, Zhang accused Buddhism of being ignorant of this functional (or phenomenological) dimension of the inner mind and mistakenly defining it as something empty. Therefore, this heterodoxy also views norms and human values, which derive from the inner mind, as illusive, thus dismantling the moral ground for a human community.

6. Concluding Remarks

Zhang Jiucheng’s comment on this phrase in the *Zhangyong* “One who

29) Zhang Jiucheng, “Shao yi lun,” *Zhang Jiucheng*, 184:44. 易所謂敬以直內也。孟子所謂盡其心知其性也。有得於此。未可已也。釋氏疑近之矣。然止於此。而不進以其乍脫人欲之營營而入天理之大。其樂無涯。遂認廓然無物者為極致。是故以堯舜禹湯文武之功業為塵垢。以父子君臣夫婦長幼為贅疣。以天地日月春夏秋冬為夢幻。離天人。絕本末。決內外。瑩瑩無偶。其視臣弑君。子弑父。兵革擾攘。歲時荒歉。皆其門外事。...有孤高之絕體。無數榮之大用。此其所以得罪於聖人也。

30) Zhang Jiucheng, “Shao yi lun,” *Zhang Jiucheng*, 184:46,

is both single-minded in his devotion to duty and mindful of the concerns of others will never stray far from the Way" (*zhongxu weidao bu yuan* 忠恕違道不遠), contains the following passages:

A superior man enlightens the nature of others with his own nature. [In so doing, he employs various institutions, cultural forms, rituals, and music]. Once making them to "see the nature" (*jianxing* 見性), they will naturally follow the way of the *zhongyong*, and past faults in speech and action will disappear without trace. ...³¹⁾

Zhang's comment here bears a clear and unmistakable resemblance to "Seeing the nature and achieving Buddhahood" (*jianxing chengfo* 見性成佛), one of the most essential doctrinal tenets of Chan Buddhism. Reading this passage, Zhu Xi relentlessly criticized Zhang's scholarship, claiming that it was directly grounded in Buddhism.³²⁾

Overall, Zhang's formulation of self-cultivation does bear great resemblance to its Buddhist counterpart. As Ari Borrell has pointed out, Zhang's interpretation of the role of Mencius as a preacher who awakened the mind of rulers is very similar to that of a "good" Chan master who could awaken the "initial determination" (*chu fa xin* 初發心) of a seeker.³³⁾ Furthermore, Zhang's emphasis on eliminating human desires and knowing (or grasping) human nature as the two-wheels of self-cultivation corresponds to the Buddhist practice of "Samatha (Calming: *zhi* 止) and Vipasyana (contemplating or discernment: *guan* 觀)."³⁴⁾ Despite these similarities, Zhang was both persistent and consistent in criticizing Buddhism, particularly, the Buddhist view on the disconnection between human nature (or the inner mind) and the sphere of human values and morality. Overall, his scholarship is grounded on a strong belief in the moral quality of human nature (or the inner mind), and the doctrinal dimension of self-cultivation focuses on how to realize it.

The doctrinal affinity between Zhang's scholarship and Buddhism

31) Zhang Jiucheng, *Zhongyong shuo*, 2.3b. 君子則以我之性覺彼之性。… 使其由此以見性。則自然由乎中庸之道。而向來無物之言。不常之行。皆掃不見迹矣。

32) Zhu Xi, "za xue bian," 72.3776.

33) In particular, concerning the story of "replacing an ox with a goat" in the *Mencius* 1A7, Zhang underlines how Mengzi evoked "the incipient compassion in the mind, which the king already put into practice without recognizing it." (*Mengzi zhuan*, 2:4b-11b.) Also, see Borrell, *ibid.*, 76-92.

34) Gimello (1978). Also, see Donner and Stevenson (1993); Buswell (1987).

should be approached from various perspectives. In the preface to the Commentary to the *Zhongyong* Zhu Xi also warns his readers about the subtle difference between Buddhism and genuine Confucianism.³⁵⁾ Zhang gained his reputation as a Confucian scholar in the unique intellectual environment of the early Southern Song, as mentioned earlier, when the Cheng learning as a whole was berated as an “empty heterodoxy” (*xuwu yiduan* 虛無異端).³⁶⁾ Conversely, however, this doctrinal affinity might have appealed to a large number of literati who were sympathetic to both Confucianism and Buddhism. The Cheng learning included Zhang’s scholarship implies the possibility of the revolving door identification between a heterodox Buddhist and a genuine Confucian simply through changing one’s understanding of human nature and/or the inner dimension of the self. The fact that the Southern Song was the real golden age of Chinese Buddhism would have helped facilitate this simple conversion.³⁷⁾

These two mutually opposing characteristics are found in Zhang’s scholarship. By comparison to the former and contemporary advocates of the Cheng learning, Zhang was an exceptionally prolific commentator on Confucian classics, covering around nine Confucian classic texts. In contrast, Cheng Yi’s commentary on the *Book of Changes* is the only classical work produced by the hand of the Cheng brothers. Yang Shi has many essay-style works, but none of them is in the form of a conventional commentary. On the other hand, Zhang put focus on extracting from these diverse classics one single principle, singling out the *datong* idea from the *Book of Documents* and the maxim of “being cautious and apprehensive over what is invisible and inaudible” from the *Zhongyong*. Turning our attention to the inner sphere, Zhang regarded the diverse and rich contents in the Confucian classics as more or less redundant to the essence of the genuine Confucian learning. He said, “The words in the *Six Classics* are [the manifestations of] the mind of the sages: If ‘I’ apprehend the mind of the sages through practicing *gewu* 格物, the Six Classics are the things in my mind” (*liu jing jie wu xin zhong wu er* 六經皆吾心中物耳),³⁸⁾ which is unambiguously reminiscent of Lu Jiuyuan’s 陸九淵 claim. In addition, Zhang’s scholarship is inconsistent in formulating this single

35) For example, see Zhu Xi’s preface to the Commentary on the *Zhongyong*.

36) For this, see Li Xinchuan, *Dao ming lu*, 4:3a-9b.

37) For this, see Gregory (1999), 1-20.

38) Zhang Jiucheng, *Mengzi zhuan* (Siku quanshu ed.), 28:2b-3a.

supreme principle and variously identifying one in accordance with the texts in consideration: “hold[ing] fast on to the *zhong*” from the *Book of Documents*; “seeking the innate mind” and “knowing one’s nature” in connection to the *Mencius*; and the maxim of “being cautious and apprehensive over what is invisible and inaudible” from the *Zhongyong* and so forth. However, this inconsistency might not obstruct us from figuring out the main characteristics of his scholarship.

Zhang seeks to avoid the primary philosophical problem inherent in the Mencian tradition, that is, the conceptual contradiction between the naturalness of the inner mind (or human nature) and the artificiality of human efforts, by separating the realm of spontaneous manifestation of the inner mind from the realm of subsequent intentional actions. This approach, however, leads to another, more fundamental problem, because it eventually dichotomizes the mind (or human nature) as both the object to seek and the agent which seeks it. This problem lay dormant in the Cheng learning tradition until Zhu Xi brought it to light and attempted to address it. Zhang Jiucheng’s own rise in his contemporary intellectual community can shed much light on how the Cheng learning tradition, which was imperiled by the fall of the Northern Song, was understood, reinterpreted, and restored in the early Southern Song, which has too long remained as a missing link in the history of Chinese philosophy.

■ Submitted: 2014.04.01 Reviewed: 2014.04.05-14 Confirmed for publication: 2014.04.15

REFERENCES

- Borrell, Ari. 1999. "Ko-wu or Kung-an? Practice, Realization, and Teaching in the Thought of Chang Chiu-ch'eng." In Gregory, Peter N. and Getz, Daniel A. Jr., eds., *Buddhism in the Sung*. 62-108. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.
- Buswell, Robert E. Jr. 1987. "The Short-cut Approach of K'an-hua Meditation: the Evolution of a Practical Subitism in Chinese Ch'an Buddhism." In Gregory, Peter N., ed., *Sudden and Gradual: Approaches to Enlightenment in Chinese Thought*. 321-377. Honolulu: The Kuroda Institute and the University of Hawaii Press.
- Cai, Renhou 蔡仁厚. 2011. *Song ming li xue* 宋明理學: *Nan song bian* 南宋篇. Taiwan: Xuesheng shu ju.
- Chan, Wing-tsit. 1963. *A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy*. Princeton: Princeton University.
- Donner, Neal A. and Stevenson, Daniel B., trans. 1993. *The Great Calming and Contemplation: A Study and Annotated Translation of the First Chapter of Chih-i's Mo-ho chih-kuan*. Honolulu: The Kuroda Institute and the University of Hawaii Press.
- Gimello, Robert M. 1978. "Mysticism and Meditation." In Katz, Steven T., ed., *Mysticism and Philosophical Analysis*. 170-199. London: Sheldon Press.
- Gregory, Peter N. 1999. "The Vitality of *Buddhism in the Sung*." In Gregory, Peter N. and Getz, Daniel A. Jr., eds., *Buddhism in the Sung*. 1-20. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.
- Hou, Wailu 侯外廬 et al. 1984-7. *Song Ming li xue shi* 宋明理學史. Beijing: Renmin chu ban she.
- Ichiki, Tsuyuhiko 市來津由彦. 2002. *Shu Ki Monjin Shūdan Keisei no Kenkyū* 朱熹門人集團形成の研究. Tokyo: Sō bunsha.
- Kondō, Masanori 近藤正則. 1988. "Chō Kyū -sei no Mōshiden ni tsuite" 張九成の孟子傳について. *Nippon Chugoku gakkai ho* 日本中國學會報 40: 109-123.
- Lee, Junghwan. 2008. "A Groundwork for Normative Unity: Zhu Xi's Reformation of The "Learning of the Way" Tradition." (Doctoral Dissertation) Harvard University.
- Legge, James., trans. 1960. *Confucian Analects*. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press.
- _____. 1960. *The Shoo Ching or the Book of Historical Records*. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press.
- Li, Xinchuan 李心傳. 1981. *Dao ming lu* 道命錄. Reprint. Taipei: Wenhai chuban she.
- Song shi* 宋史. 1977. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju.
- Teraji, Jun 寺地遵. 1988. *Nansō shoki seijishi kenkyū* 南宋初期政治史研究.

Hiroshima-shi: Keisuisha.

Tillman, Hoyt C. 1992. *Confucian Discourse and Chu Hsi's Ascendancy*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.

Zhang, Jiucheng 張九成. 1983. *Mengzi zhuan* 孟子傳. Siku quanshu ed.

_____. 1936. *Zhongyong shuo* 中庸說. Reprint. Shanghai: Shangwuyin shuguan.

_____. 2006. *Zhang Jiucheng* 張九成. In *Quan Songwen* 全宋文. Vols. 183-4. Shanghai: Shanghai ci shu chu ban she.

Zhu, Xi 朱熹. 1996. *Zhu Xi ji* 朱熹集. Chengdu Shi: Sichuan jiaoyu chubanshe.

張九成——南宋初期程學系的代表學者

李定桓

中文摘要

本論文通過研究張九成(1092-1159)的思想，試圖明確指出在新儒學歷史研究領域還未被充分探討的南宋初期“程學傳統之性格”。張九成的學術有以下兩個鮮明的特點：第一，在當時大多數程學系學者都還未曾撰述過注釋書，但張九成卻對《中庸》、《孟子》、《書經》等多部儒家經典進行了注釋書；第二，他自始至終都把解析經典的重點放在從經典推理出單一的道德修養之原理上。這個單一的道德修養之原理主要集中在怎樣把握性或心的內在道德性並努力把牠運用到實踐上的問題上。他認為這樣的道德修養其在實踐層面上與佛教的相應領域的性格十分相似，而這一點卻引起朱子和後代新儒學學者們的批判。

儘管如此，在南宋初期的學者中張九成獲得了相當高的地位，這也正為探究當時人們如何理解程學傳統提供了的重要線索。在哲學上，他把“心之自然發生的發現”領域和隨之而生的“道德修養的有目的的行爲”領域分開，並試圖化解心或性中的自然性與道德修養中的人為性之間存在的所謂概念上的矛盾。然而這種方式又導致了新的哲學問題產生，即把作為追求對象的心和性與追求它們的主體之“心”一分為二的問題，後來朱子對此問題全面的探究。

關鍵詞：張九成、程學、傳統、心的自然性、道德修養的人為性、自然發生的發現、南宋初期