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[Vol.22 (2014)] Moral Agent and Practical Functions in Cheong Yagyong's Theory of Mind
Author : KIM Woohyung
Date : 19.04.03
Page : 49-66
Keyword : Cheong Yagyong, theory of mind, moral agent, practical function, gwonhyeong (weighing)
Abstract :

This paper examines the characteristics of moral agent and practical functions in Cheong Yagyong's (1762-1836) theory of mind (xin ). In Cheongs thought, daeche (greater substance) or yeongche (spiritual substance) are intangible and transcendent substances harbored in a material body but different from it. The substance of mind in itself has only an ontological meaning and does not hold any implications as a agent. It is through a moral function that the mind qualifies as a possible agent. Cheong's explication on the functions of the mind is confined to a practical dimension. Feeling (jeong ), desire (yok ), and will (ji ), which are all practical functions of the mind, are object-oriented, while intention (ui ) is the deliberation of internal movements in the mind. Cheong interprets nature (xing ) as a moral tendency or intentionality from which feeling, desire, and will are issued. In the place of intention, he employs a new concept: gwonhyeong , which means to weigh and choose between a moral inclination and a physical appetite. Gwonhyeong, whose function is secondary to the moral disposition for goodness (virtue), does not mean free will. Although Cheong's theory of mind is original, the absence of explanation for its cognitive function exposes a theoretical limitation.

Attachments : ART001902175.pdf

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